ib12donH UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 PATRICK DONOHUE, on behalf of 3 S.J.D., et al., 4 Plaintiffs, New York, N.Y. 5 18 Civ. 9364(DAB) v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 6 EDUCATION, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 Hearing November 1, 2018 9 10:50 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. DEBORAH A. BATTS, 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 BRAIN INJURY RIGHTS GROUP, LLC Attorneys for Plaintiffs BY: KARL J. ASHANTI 16 MOSHE INDIG 17 RALPH M. GERSTEIN ZACHARY W. CARTER 18 Corporation Counsel of the City of New York 19 DAVID S. THAYER Assistant Corporation Counsel 20 BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD Attorney General of the State of New York 21 BY: JAMES B. COONEY Assistant Attorney General 22 ALSO PRESENT: 23 JOSEPH RIVERA JR. 24 Staff Attorney Office of the General Counsel 25 Special Education Unit New York City Department of Education

(Case called) 1 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your names for the record, starting with plaintiffs' counsel. 3 MR. ASHANTI: Yes, Karl Ashanti, from the Brain 4 5 Injury Rights Group, on behalf of the plaintiff Patrick Donohue. 6 7 THE COURT: Is the Brain Injury Rights Group a law firm? 8 9 MR. ASHANTI: It is, your Honor, a nonprofit under 10 501(c), a nonprofit firm. THE COURT: It is a law firm. 11 12 MR. ASHANTI: It is a law firm. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. 14 Let me tell everyone that there are microphones on the 15 Please do not bother to stand to talk. Those of you who will be talking, use the microphone. Okay? 16 17 Beside Mr. Ashanti, we have? MR. INDIG: Moshe Indig, also from Brain Injury Rights 18 Group, also attorneys for plaintiffs. 19 20 THE COURT: And? 21 MR. DONOHUE: Patrick Donohue, your Honor. 22 MR. GERSTEIN: Ralph Gerstein, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Nice to see all of you. 24 On behalf of the defendants we have? 25 MR. THAYER: David Thayer, from the New York City Law

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characterization.

Department, on behalf of the New York City Department of 1 2 Education. 3 THE COURT: And? 4 MR. RIVERA: Joseph Rivera, Jr., on behalf of the New 5 York City Department of Education. 6 MR. COONEY: Assistant Attorney General, James B. 7 Cooney, on behalf of the New York State Education Department. THE COURT: I'm sorry? 8 9 MR. COONEY: On behalf of the New York State Education 10 Department. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, I just wanted to note for 12 13 the record that, in addition to Mr. Donahue, his daughter, who 14 is a plaintiff, S.J.D., is also in the courtroom in the back. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. This is in a very strange posture. It is 16 17 not clear that this is ripe for federal court involvement. I understand it correctly, the plaintiffs' position is that 18 they have very specific ideas about what would qualify as an 19 20 open hearing. I get it that the defendants do not agree with their 21 22 definition of an open hearing. Is that fair? 23 MR. COONEY: That is fair, your Honor. 24 MR. THAYER: Yes, we would agree with that

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1 THE COURT: What is it exactly that the plaintiffs 2 want in terms of this hearing? 3 MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor. 4 What we would like, your Honor, is a full hearing to 5 adjudicate the definition and the scope of "open hearing" as it 6 is --7 THE COURT: You mean before me? MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Wait a second. Why is there a problem 10 with "open hearing" definition? Where is it defined? MR. ASHANTI: That is under 34 CFR 300.512(c), your 11 12 It is a federal statutorily guaranteed right to the 13 plaintiff that we are seeking to enforce and vindicate on 14 behalf of the plaintiffs. 15 THE COURT: Let me ask it another way. What says what is not an open hearing? 16 17 MR. ASHANTI: I'm sorry, your Honor? THE COURT: In other words, you say you want an open 18 hearing; and if I understand it correctly, you wanted to be 19 20 able to accommodate hundreds of people and you also wanted to 21 have audiovisual coverage, and I am saying that it is not clear 22 to me that that is what was intended by the term "open 23 hearing." 24 MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, that's precisely what we

would like to be able to adjudicate before the court.

THE COURT: You can't adjudicate it necessarily.

The other problem I am having is, I don't know that you are ready to be here before me. You know what, let me just hear from Mr. Thayer and Mr. Cooney on that before we proceed.

MR. THAYER: Yes, your Honor.

I think that the question of whether or not the plaintiffs are properly before the court is spot on. We believe that they have not exhausted their administrative remedies. The complaint and the request for the preliminary injunction refer to phone calls to certain persons and complaints filed with the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings.

And, as I am sure the court is well aware, the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the IDEA world in New York is very clear-cut and straightforward. If the plaintiffs have an issue with a ruling of an impartial hearing officer, they can take that to the Office of State Review, before a state review officer, who will then adjudicate whether or not those issues are sustainable or are proper, or what have you. And then if they disagree with that determination by the SRO, they can take it to a federal district court.

In this case, it is my impression that plaintiffs are alleging that this particular matter is arising under section 1415(j) of the IDEA, which deals with pendency determinations. There is some case law that states that an issue with a

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pendency determination is immediately appealable to a federal district court.

But if one goes through the amended complaint and the request for preliminary injunction, it becomes very clear that this case is not about an actual underlying pendency determination. This is, as your Honor pointed out, about the size of an open hearing and the types of media outlets that are able to enter that open hearing. And those issues are very much within the power and, excuse me, also the question of whether or not the IHO should recuse himself. Those issues are well within the power of the SRO to opine upon and would be well within this court's power to opine upon after the SRO has in order to effectuate the statutory balance that the IDEA struck between the federal government's interest in protecting the rights of disabled children and the state's interest in the education of children. For the court to step in at this juncture would be both premature, and I think would be in excess of its subject-matter jurisdiction.

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Mr. Cooney.

MR. COONEY: Yes. I agree with everything the city says. I would just add a couple points.

I think this is premature in that all -- again, I think your Honor is reading this correctly. It is what the definition of "open hearing" means. That's all this is about.

And that's not properly before this court. Because if it was, then the entire system that was just outlined here would run amuck because everybody would be unhappy with the discretionary ruling by an IHO, and they would come running into here and federal courts would then be babysitting every hearing, whether it is on a discretionary determination of whether an IHO should recuse themselves or how big the space is necessary or the audiovisual component.

Again, they have been granted an open hearing, as it is understood and as ruled upon in a discretionary ruling by the IHO. This is not a sealed proceeding. The only thing not available is a space to accommodate I think 100 to 200 people. I think it can accommodate 30 people, and press are available to go and the parent has exercised his right to waive it being held sealed. It is publicly done. That's what he has done.

So, and again, it is all hypothetical. We don't know, and I have not heard, that at the first round of hearings that we had 200 people knocking on the doors demanding to come in. If they can tell us that, then maybe the IHO might say, hmm, I might need a spillover room, just like if in this court right now, we had 200 people beating at the gates of your door and you would say, you know what? I don't have enough space, but it is under my discretion how I control my courtroom, and maybe you will get the live audio feed into another courtroom where the spillover can happen. But that's in your discretion

because you control your courtroom.

So that's essentially what's going on here. And again, it is all premature. It is all hypothetical, because we don't know. And I have not been told that 100 to 200 people have even, again, been demanding to come in. If they can elucidate on the numbers that came in the first hearing, I think that would be interesting, to me at least.

Also, I don't know the media presence. Do we have -I don't hear the media saying our First Amendment rights are
being trammeled on because we can't come in and record. So I
don't know if they actually even have standing on this issue
either.

Let me just close by reading what Judge Castel has already, I would say, ruled on or found in this issue. I'm reading from the transcript of October 15, 2018, and I will start off with the quotes.

THE COURT: What page?

MR. COONEY: It is page 31. I will start with the whole paragraph:

"It is the case from reading decisions of a district court in this circuit that it is not uncommon that there is an allegation of a violation of due process or in fact a violation of due process in a hearing before a hearing officer. The scheme that has been developed provides for review of that.

The notion that an aggrieved party, whether it is a parent or

the New York City Department of Education, can come into a
United States District Court and seek to challenge actions that
they expect will take place before a hearing officer before the
events have taken place is an improvident way to proceed and
contrary to the entire structure set up under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. If an IHO tramples on
someone's due process rights, the remedy is to go to the SRO
and then to the district courts."

I will stop there.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ASHANTI: Just in response, brief response to the A.G.'s office, this -- Judge Castel's opinion was issued before October 16 of this year. On October 16, there was the first date of this hearing.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ASHANTI: So at that point, Judge Castel was looking at what might have occurred or might occur in the future, one day later.

THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you. I'm sorry,
Mr. Ashanti. How many people did show up on October 16?
MR. ASHANTI: In total, your Honor, it had to have

been at least 60 to 70, and that was after -- with the understanding that there would not be proper accommodations.

We actually -- there were several families who wanted to appear, but it wasn't -- for instance, it wasn't safe for the children of those families, who are similarly disabled as S.J.D. is, to go to the hearing room, which was the problem in the first place. It did not accommodate the presence of those children. We were talking about several dozen of --

THE COURT: But this is what I am not understanding. Are the other children parties to this?

MR. ASHANTI: They are not parties, but they are members of the public and their families are similarly situated to the plaintiff.

THE COURT: I understand that. But this is the difficulty. Are you saying that the procedural due process requires that everyone who wants to be present can be present?

MR. ASHANTI: No, your Honor. But we would like to have a proper adjudication of what the scope means, because it is, you know, contrary to the flippant way in which the defense has looked at the idea of an open hearing, it is a federally guaranteed statutory right.

THE COURT: It is a federally guaranteed right. I'm not arguing that you have a right to an open hearing.

MR. ASHANTI: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: The question is, what is an open hearing?

MR. ASHANTI: And that's exactly what we would like to adjudicate. We do have a very, you know, specific opinion as

to what that is and --

THE COURT: But what is it based on? What is your opinion based on? Is there law supporting your opinion?

MR. ASHANTI: Well, your Honor, this is a matter of first impression in that this is the first --

THE COURT: And you know why this is a matter of first impression?

MR. ASHANTI: I do know why, and that is because no other plaintiff who has been in the position of the plaintiffs here, a disabled child seeking to vindicate his or her educational rights before the New York City Board of Education, has sought an open hearing. So this is a right that has been sitting on the books, your Honor, --

THE COURT: I am not --

MR. ASHANTI: -- collecting dust --

THE COURT: I'm not exactly sure that you are saying that you are not, you are saying you are not getting an open hearing unless what?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  ASHANTI: Unless there is access to audiovisual media, unless there is access to --

THE COURT: Who is defining that? Where are you getting that?

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, that's the public. There is a strong public interest in this matter in that the public should be able to -- if you look on YouTube for instance, any

person who is similarly situated to the plaintiffs here, who are trying to get the information about what this -- these impartial hearings are about, they are not able to because it doesn't exist, because they -- this is a matter where only the -- these plaintiffs have been the only ones who really sought to vindicate those rights, who really sought to enforce those rights.

THE COURT: Then this might be a novelty. Maybe no one else wants this. Is this a "one off" thing that I have to spend my time trying to adjudicate on a record that doesn't exist yet?

MR. ASHANTI: No, your Honor, because it is something that -- it is really -- most people don't know about. And that's the whole idea. It is -- these are -- these impartial hearings affect over 200,000 New York City school children who are disabled who are seeking special education services, and that's just in the City of New York. This is -- this is a nationwide issue. But these families don't know that they have this right, your Honor.

THE COURT: But any --

MR. ASHANTI: It is not as though they have been battling the DOE and they have been losing this fight. This is a fight that they haven't taken on because they don't know that they have this right.

MR. COONEY: May I address, just getting back to real

world principles, James Cooney here, there is a right to open courts, but you don't allow video cameras. I believe that is the case both — it is the initial ruling in state courts and federal courts, as I understand it, with exceptions probably.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Would you say that again?

MR. COONEY: That there is a rule within federal and state courts that there are no video cameras in courts, unless --

THE COURT: Well, there is actually a prohibition in federal court.

MR. COONEY: Yes. In state courts, if it is a federal criminal trial, where evidence is going to be taken and you have witnesses, as I understand it, that also there is a prohibition under the civil rights law.

This is akin to saying that, because it is public, members of the press can come in and they can take notes, they can do whatever. The only thing is the audiovisual component. People of the public can come in. They can take notes. They can hear this. They can see it.

All plaintiff seems to be saying is that you, this court, who is --

THE COURT: On this record.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  THAYER: -- on this record, whose specialty is not this, decide this --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. I'm a generalist. I don't

have specialties.

MR. COONEY: What I'm trying to -- with all due respect, I'm not trying to disrespect your Honor. I'm saying that, again, this is a case that should go follow the parameters precisely for these reasons, because this is a first impression type of case. So if they don't like the ruling by the IHO, go to the SRO and let them adjudicate that in the normal course. Because, again, they are specialists on this. Then if you don't like that, brief that, bring an appeal, then you come to the district court. If they don't like that, they can appeal that to the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Well, they probably should go to the circuit first.

MR. COONEY: The circuit. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. But there is -- to go directly now to you, again, on no record in this hypothetical land doesn't make sense.

I am going back to something else that he said. There are a lot of people that are interested in the criminal justice system that maybe don't know that courts are open or in the civil court system that courts are open. That doesn't mean that you should be videotaping or allowing videotaping here so it can go on YouTube so people can see that might be civil litigants later on to see what the civil litigation process is. Because that's literally what they are saying.

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, just very briefly, there has been mischaracterization of what the plaintiffs -- we are the best people to inform your Honor as to what our claims are This is not a hypothetical. We are talking about real individuals. S.J.D. is in the back room -- in the back of this courtroom, your Honor. She is a real person, she has real rights, and we are seeking to enforce those rights. THE COURT: But you are saying her rights include having anybody else in there who wants to be in there? That's her right? MR. ASHANTI: No, your Honor. THE COURT: You have about 16 --MR. ASHANTI: No. THE COURT: -- different arguments, and I'm trying to figure out --(Discussion off the record between the court reporter and counsel) MR. ASHANTI: No, your Honor. Were you finished? THE COURT: No. I will let you go. MR. ASHANTI: Thank you. It is not -- we are not seeking a free-for-all, your Honor. And the most important part --THE COURT: I didn't say a free-for-all. I'm asking whose rights are you seeking to vindicate? MR. ASHANTI: Technically they are the rights of the

parent. Under the federal statute that we are citing, the rights of the parent as looking out for the interest of the child, the disabled child in this instance.

THE COURT: To ask for an open hearing.

MR. ASHANTI: To ask for an open hearing. And he is seeking to enforce his rights in that regard on behalf of his daughter.

And there is a very important point, your Honor, if I may please make it. This is not about -- this is not premature. This is not something that can be appealed. We are seeking --

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. ASHANTI: We are seeking emergent relief, your Honor, and that ties into the exhaustion issue, when this has been fully exhausted.

THE COURT: I don't understand how it has been fully exhaust.

MR. DONOHUE: Because there is no mechanism for emergent relief under the SRO system. There has been continual reference by the A.G.'s office and by the city to the appeal system, you can appeal to the SRO, and take care of it that way. That's not true, your Honor. That's not correct. That's false information. There is no appeal mechanism — excuse me, emergent relief mechanism under the SRO.

THE COURT: What is the word you are using?

MR. ASHANTI: Emergent relief.

THE COURT: Emergent?

MR. ASHANTI: Yes, like immediate relief. They don't have -- for the kind of relief that we are seeking here, preliminary injunction, your Honor. They don't have that mechanism within that SRO system, "SRO" meaning state review office. They don't have that within that system. So we have exhausted the remedies with respect to emergent relief for the vindication of these rights. This is something that is a real live controversy. The plaintiffs here go back to court on December 4, your Honor. So this is something that is very much live. And without the relief that's being sought here, there will be a missed opportunity. What we are really seeking here is the vindication of the rights, but as a means to protect the legacy of S.J.D. There is strong public interest in this, your Honor. From the time that she was born, you know, two weeks after --

THE COURT: Listen. I don't want to hear that. That has nothing to do with what I am dealing with right now. I am sure that there is a public interest in this. I just --

MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor. So that's one of the standards that we have to meet, the prongs that we have to meet for the preliminary injunction that we are seeking. It is not a standard run-of-the-mill case that would end up being appealed to the SRO, like I was mentioning, because we have

exhausted the remedies, because they don't have a mechanism for 1 2 emergent relief. 3 THE COURT: I don't --4 MR. ASHANTI: And there has been no --5 THE COURT: -- see why you need preliminary injunction 6 relief. I don't see why we need to go that route since you are 7 asking me to make decisions on hypotheticals, what might happen, what could be --8 9 MR. ASHANTI: This is -- your Honor, with all due 10 respect, this is not a hypothetical. We went to the first date 11 of the hearing on October 16, and there was rulings made by the 12 IHO that were discriminatory. 13 THE COURT: Well, they may be discriminatory but at 14 this point they are discretionary, and you are asking me to 15 come --MR. ASHANTI: Well, that --16 17 THE COURT: -- back and say, oh, no, you --MR. ASHANTI: This --18 19 THE COURT: -- can't that. 20 Do not talk over me. 21 MR. ASHANTI: I apologize, your Honor. I apologize. 22 THE COURT: If it turns out that there is a record 23 that is developed and you go to the SRO because you don't like 24 the rulings made, the actual rulings made by the IHO, then it 25 seems to me that you are giving a basis for someone to

determine on these facts it was open, it wasn't open. But what I am saying to you is that there is nothing here that would permit me to say, oh, yeah, what he did was wrong.

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, I am holding in my hand a transcript of the proceedings.

THE COURT: I haven't --

MR. ASHANTI: We have a record, your Honor. This is -- the record is in my hand. We know what happened. We know it is going to continue to happen. This is something that is -- and it is not moot. It is not premature. This is something that is capable of repetition.

MR. COONEY: Again, I --

MR. ASHANTI: Excuse me.

We are going back to court on December 4. We were in court already on October 16. I have the transcript of the proceedings. This is an ongoing controversy. There is nothing about this that is hypothetical, your Honor.

THE COURT: But what I am saying is that it is not clear to me that what you have is a sufficient basis to bring emergent relief for not having this go forward. With a unique question, with no record, with no background, you expect a ruling from the federal court.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, we satisfied the prongs, your Honor.

THE COURT: How?

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1 MR. ASHANTI: Because we have likelihood of success on 2 the merits. 3 THE COURT: Oh, you do? 4 MR. ASHANTI: Yes, we do, because of the statements 5 that were made by the IHO. THE COURT: Wait. You have likelihood of success on 6 7 the merits in terms of having the IHO overruled? Is that what 8 you are saying? 9 MR. ASHANTI: No, your Honor, in terms of the fact 10 that he denied the access to the audiovisual media and stating 11 flatly, oh, well, there will be no audio recording. That was 12 one of the rulings that he made. 13 THE COURT: I --14 MR. ASHANTI: And then still -- I apologize, your 15 Honor. I apologize. THE COURT: He said that was a ruling, there will be 16 17 no audio, there will be no video? What did he say. 18 MR. ASHANTI: That is correct, your Honor. But yet 19 and still --20 THE COURT: But where is the right to have 21 audiovisual? You have a right to have the public present. You 22 don't have the right to have the public present in a certain 23 way at a certain number. At some point, it may be if you want

to hold this in Giants Stadium so that everybody can be

accommodated that's one thing, but I do not think that there is

a due process right to do that.

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, for instance, I just wanted to make it -- make it as real as possible. What happened on October 16 was the IHO stated that he was denying the access to the audiovisual media of the proceeding because it would be embarrassing to have S.J.D., as a disabled child, in front of the camera; that it would be bordering on child abuse, your Honor. These are the bases that he used. All of them were discriminatory.

THE COURT: Whoa, whoa, whoa.

MR. ASHANTI: He threatened --

THE COURT: You can put a conclusory label on just about anything. Why do you say that was discriminatory?

MR. ASHANTI: Because he said that the reason he is denying access to the audiovisual media, that he would not videotape the proceedings, because it would be embarrassing to have her on camera.

THE COURT: Does he have the ability to do that, to put it on audiovisual? Is it within the means of the IHO to do that?

MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor. That's actually part of the whole problem because --

THE COURT: Has this been done in the past?

MR. ASHANTI: They are routinely audio recorded. So he said you can't have audio recording. Yet and still --

THE COURT: Who audio records it?

MR. ASHANTI: The transcriber, your Honor. There is a court reporter.

THE COURT: So there is a court reporter making a record of what's going on.

MR. ASHANTI: Using audio, an audio recording for that purpose.

THE COURT: All right. So that there is a record, for anybody who is interested in it, to see verbatim what was said.

MR. ASHANTI: A transcript, your Honor, is not the same, as I'm sure the court knows, as actually seeing the proceedings, actually understanding --

THE COURT: I think this is too ephemeral for me to say that a transcript is not sufficient. Did he say that reporters could not be present?

MR. ASHANTI: He stated that there could only be print media, and not the visual media.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, you know something? This is a very, very sort of generational problem. In the past, people who were interested could show up if it was public. In the past, people could read about it after the fact. But you are saying that it is a due process right to have people there right there when it is going on to support the plaintiff? Is that what you are saying?

MR. ASHANTI: Even if they are not, you know,

physically present, because obviously if there is a video recording of it, people who watch it later wouldn't be physically present. That is what it would mean to have access to the public. So there would be certain amounts of people who, you know, are able to attend personally, in person, and we have some of them here in this courtroom, your Honor, who can attest to the discriminatory language and rulings of IHO Lloyd.

THE COURT: But this is my problem, Mr. Ashanti. I am not going to create a precedent whereby every time any discretionary ruling is made by an officer or a court that it is a basis for coming into another court and having it overruled. That is not appropriate. There is a process that it should go through, there is a ruling, a finding by the IHO. There is an appeal to the SRO. The SRO makes a record. There is something for a federal court to see in terms of whether it was an open hearing.

MR. ASHANTI: Understood, your Honor. But, again, we are talking about something that would cause irreparable harm if it's --

THE COURT: How is it irreparable harm?

MR. ASHANTI: Because that opportunity would be missed.

THE COURT: Whose opportunity? The public?

MR. ASHANTI: The public, but really the right of the plaintiff to have an open hearing. So if he --

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THE COURT: No, no. Please. I am tired of going in circles. You don't like the definition of the open hearing that provides a transcript, that provides print media being present, that provides people who can come in to come in. You don't think that's an open meeting --MR. ASHANTI: Not sufficiently because --THE COURT: -- or open hearing. MR. ASHANTI: -- it is the right of the plaintiff, your Honor. But beyond that, I want to make one point on that really, on this. There is discretion by an IHO, but IHO, no individual who was in a position of authority, has the right to make as his or her basis the rulings that a person makes, in this case an IHO, be based on discriminatory grounds. That is not within the realm of discretion. THE COURT: And discriminatory grounds are what here? MR. ASHANTI: The IHO specifically stated, and we have the transcript, your Honor, we can give your Honor a copy of it. MR. COONEY: May I, for a second? MR. ASHANTI: Excuse me, your Honor. Excuse me. Excuse me. Excuse me. MR. COONEY: This is the first time I have even heard of a transcript --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COONEY: -- of discriminatory intent.

MR. ASHANTI: Right. Okay.

So, your Honor, we have a transcript. We have the -obviously the DOE has access to it as well. I'm sure the
A.G.'s office does, as well.

MR. COONEY: I do not. It is the first time I have ever heard of this right now.

MR. ASHANTI: I have no control over that. But the point is --

MR. COONEY: You could have put it in your papers.

MR. ASHANTI: They are not in the papers, your Honor. We just received a copy yesterday.

But the point is, the transcript shows that the rulings that were made regarding these issues, the audiovisual presence, the audiovisual media being allowed access and in this case denied access was specifically because the IHO felt that it would border on child abuse to have a disabled child on camera. He actually threatened the plaintiff, who has cared for his daughter beyond, you know, all reasonable means that you would see a normal parent normally would take, threatened this plaintiff with a guardian ad litemship, saying he would take away the ability of this parent to advocate for his own child and appoint a guardian ad litem just because he disagreed with the rulings and felt that S.J.D. was owed an apology for suggesting stating — flatly stating, actually, that it would

MR. ASHANTI: That is discriminatory.

be abusive and embarrassing to have her on camera just because she is a disabled child. That is wrong, your Honor.

THE COURT: That may be wrong.

THE COURT: That may be wrong. It is not discriminatory to the point where it comes to me at this point. I am sorry. I do not agree with you. Every time he says something wrong, you don't like it, you come back here? No.

MR. ASHANTI: I agree, your Honor. But we are not talking just about any ruling. We are talking about something that is a federally guaranteed right for this plaintiff.

THE COURT: What I am trying to get across to you is that a transcript, press being permitted in, the public who can get in being permitted in, I do not see anything that suggests you have a right to more than that.

MR. COONEY: May I interrupt also, your Honor? I am kind of surprised, and if this is true, that plaintiffs' counsel has not disclosed to the court a change in circumstance actually beneficial to them. As I understand it from the city, which, again, I just learned this morning as I came in, the forum has now changed to -- and I will let the city take over on this.

MR. THAYER: Brooklyn Borough Hall's ceremonial courtroom.

MR. COONEY: It's actually been enlarged, which they

haven't even mentioned. So this shows the bad faith, I believe, where they are not even telling your Honor the full story here.

MR. ASHANTI: That is improper, your Honor. That suggestion that there is any bad faith is improper.

The point being, your Honor --

THE COURT: No, no. But respond to him. How does he know and you don't know that it's been moved to the ceremonial courtroom in --

MR. COONEY: I was just advised by the city.

THE COURT: -- Borough Hall?

MR. THAYER: Yes.

THE COURT: One at a time.

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Wait. Here are the rules. The court reporter can only record one person at a time. And if that one person happens to be me, anything else you are saying does not get recorded. And I am sure that you want what you are saying recorded. So let's go one at a time.

Let me hear from the city in terms of the change of venue.

MR. THAYER: Yes, your Honor.

It came to my knowledge yesterday afternoon that the new venue for the next scheduled hearing date for December 4 is going to be held on -- held at the Brooklyn Borough Hall

courtroom. It has been relayed to me that that can accommodate around 180 people seated and more, if seats are removed. I haven't seen the courtroom myself, so I'm not sure of the layout. But insofar as plaintiffs want greater attendance, it is there.

I think the irreparable harm that plaintiffs are talking about is -- remains speculative. We don't know how many people will show up, but although there is space to accommodate a greater number.

MR. ASHANTI: And, your Honor, I would just point out that that is actually a concession that is in our favor. That supports our position of our definition of an open hearing, that there would be that concession by the city. So we are moving towards the plaintiffs' definition --

THE COURT: No, no.

MR. ASHANTI: -- of what an open hearing is and what he --

THE COURT: I have no basis for agreeing with you or agreeing with them. This is something that has not been adjudicated before. And on the record before me now, it is not appropriate to adjudicate it because there is nothing before me except complaints about rulings that have been made preliminarily. I am not going to adopt the position that any time any hearing officer says anything that anybody doesn't like, that that is a basis to come in to federal court.

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MR. ASHANTI: Well, your Honor, I would just point out that it is really curious that the city at this juncture has, number one, consented to the larger venue and did not object, has not objected, stated affirmatively that they do not object either to the recusal of IHO Lloyd, because they were present for his discriminatory actions against S.J.D. and Patrick Donahue, and they also do not object to the video recording. So we are here in a situation --THE COURT: If there is going to be no objection to it and it takes place, what are you here before me for? MR. ASHANTI: Exactly, your Honor, because the obstacle is IHO Lloyd and his rulings. THE COURT: And you want me to tell him to recuse himself or throw him off? MR. ASHANTI: Not recuse, your Honor. I was just pointing that out as a matter of saying that the DOE understands the discriminatory nature of his actions on October 16. MR. THAYER: Your Honor --MR. COONEY: I object. THE COURT: Just a second. That's enough. Please. MR. THAYER: Your Honor, I really take issue with the characterization of the DOE's position here. The DOE is not

obliged to consent to every request of an opposing litigant in

an adversarial process, first of all.

Second of all, the provision of the larger courthouse is not a concession that plaintiffs are legally entitled to an open hearing in a room of any size.

And there was one other point that, I'm sorry, your Honor, I lost it.

MR. ASHANTI: But it certainly doesn't militate against our position that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. If anything, it militates in favor of it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Just, look, Mr. Ashanti --

MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- I have read your papers --

MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and I have looked at the transcripts before the two federal judges who have heard this already. You were not granted a TRO. This is a hearing for a preliminary injunction. The standards require that there is probability of success on the merits, and the success that you want is to have this court determine, identify, and specify what the definition of an open hearing is based on nothing.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, your Honor, I would just point out, without that, it is just on paper. This right is meaningless without any sort of enforcement mechanism. If we don't have the right to come to court and have this emergent relief granted, your Honor, if we don't have the right to say,

okay, we know what's been happening because this is what occurred already, it's not hypothetical, this is what happened on October 16, we are going back on December 4, this is going to keep happening, there is going to be these denial of access of the audiovisual media, and that is something —

THE COURT: Listen. I don't understand. You expect
me as a federal court to say that they have to provide for all,
going forward. Understand, this isn't just to this case. This
is setting precedent. And you want me to say that every
hearing where the parent is okay with it has to have
audiovisual recording as well as stenographic recording as well
as print media there? I am not ready to say that. I don't
think that you can provide evidence that you will succeed in
getting me or any court to say that, by right, you have to have
all of these things.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, your Honor, it is for one reason only. It is the parent's decision.

THE COURT: It is the parent's decision to have an open hearing. The parent does not --

MR. ASHANTI: To --

THE COURT: The parent does not get to define what an open hearing is and if they don't get what they want, then they go to court.

MR. ASHANTI: But the --

THE COURT: No "but."

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, the whole idea, though, is the -- of the rights of the disabled child in seeking to vindicate his or her educational rights, and the parent -- the parent stands in the place of looking over those decisions on behalf of that child. And so in asserting this right, it is our position that it is in Mr. Donohue's purview to say whether or not his daughter can be put on camera.

THE COURT: Okay. I am not --

MR. ASHANTI: That that is not child abuse.

THE COURT: -- going into that. I am not going into that. Okay. That's one thing that was done. So the next hearing, several other things are going to be done, and each time you are going to come back here and say that due process has been ignored because the judge ruled this way in an ongoing proceeding?

MR. ASHANTI: This is just one -- this is it, your Honor. This is -- we have been consistent from the beginning. It is 34 CFR 300.512(c). That is what we are asserting. I have copies of that provision, your Honor. We are not asserting any other rights in this area. Of course that -- we are saying that it touches upon the fact that there should be access to the -- for the media, for audiovisual media. We are saying -- but all of that is within the scope of Mr. Donohue's assertion of that right under that one singular provision. So it is not something where we will be coming back to court after

ever hearing, your Honor. We certainly wouldn't be doing that. This is a discreet issue, your Honor.

(Pause)

MR. ASHANTI: I have copies of the provision if you would like, your Honor.

MR. THAYER: Your Honor, there is one additional thing that I would like to add because we have been discussing the audiovisual media and the decisions of the IHO or the allegedly biased or improper decisions of the IHO.

The first point in the city's brief points out that the IHO is not a city employee, and to the extent that the plaintiffs have issues with a particular decision about language that the IHO made in a particular hearing, the city has no control. Even if the court were to grant an injunction, the city has no control over the IHO with regards to his discretionary decisions or his language.

(Pause)

MR. ASHANTI: And, your Honor, I would just like to point out, in response to the city stating that they don't have power over the IHO, well, that's precisely why the Attorney General's office is also a defendant here. And we are not seeking a ruling from the city, your Honor. We are seeking a ruling from this court, which does have the power to grant the emergent relief that is not — plaintiffs do not have under the SRO system.

THE COURT: I understand. But my problem is that I do not think that you will succeed on the merits. I don't think that you have a right to the emergent relief that you want for me to define specifically that they have to give you everything that you want and otherwise it is not an open hearing.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, what would it mean to be open to the public if the public cannot have access to it, your Honor? Even if it were --

THE COURT: The public can have access. It doesn't say immediate access. The only time I see anything about open hearing is in 8 NYCRR 200.5(x) which defines, "The hearing shall be conducted at a time and a place which is reasonably convenient to the parent and student involved and shall be closed to the public unless the parent requests an open hearing."

MR. ASHANTI: Correct. And the plaintiff here is doing so under --

THE COURT: Okay. So he has requested an open hearing. But what I am saying is, aside from that, there is no guidance as to what an open hearing is.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, your Honor, it is specifically in the statute. It states, and I am reading from 34 CFR 300.512(c), "Parents involved in hearings must be given the right to have the child who is the subject of the hearing present, open the hearing to the public," your Honor, "and have

a record of the hearing with findings of fact and decisions, described in paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5) of this section, provided at no cost to parents."

And so what Mr. Donohue is entitled to, your Honor, under the statute, is that it be open to the public. We are stating that is not just people who happen to have been there present at the time, it is the public. There are hundreds of thousands of families who are similarly situated to

Mr. Donohue. We have a few of them here, who were also present at the proceedings on October 16, who can attest to the discriminatory nature of the exercise of the discretion of IHO Lloyd, which they are not entitled to have rulings that are based on discriminatory grounds. And so the public, that term, "public," in that provision, your Honor, we are stating that that means that there has to be some mechanism for the public to have access to see really what goes on in —

THE COURT: To see or to know?

MR. ASHANTI: Well, to know, your Honor.

THE COURT: And they can know --

MR. ASHANTI: Without --

THE COURT: -- from a transcript, they can know from the press, they can know from those who are present. And you want me to go beyond that.

MR. ASHANTI: Yes, because it doesn't capture really -- my point, in pointing out that these other families

were present -- who were present are present who are today is because they can attest to the fact that hearing the words and looking at the transcript doesn't capture really the power of the discriminatory grounds that --

ephemeral and so speculative to me, "doesn't capture the power." "You gotta be there to see it." I don't believe that this is something that I am willing to encapsulate in the law by making a ruling that you have to get everything that you want, you have to have room for as many people as you want. I am sorry. There are limitations. It's got to be reasonable.

MR. ASHANTI: Absolutely, your Honor, and we are not taking issue. The reason why I didn't come in here and the first thing I said, well, the room that was given to the plaintiffs is not big enough. The reason is -- and I wasn't hiding any information from your Honor -- is because what -- the accommodation that's been granted by having the courtroom that's available at Borough Hall is sufficiently large at this time, but that does not make it open to the public. It's only those persons who would be present on December 4 in that particular courtroom open to the public, which is the reason we want the video recording is, someone who is not present there, someone who is in Arizona and is in the same position as Mr. Donohue can look and potentially have access to see what the proceedings are about and what goes on later at a point in

time -- at a later point this time. That's the whole point of it being a recording, your Honor. So we are not saying that everyone who wants to be there in the entire universe has to be able to be given access. We at this point in time take no exception with the size of the physical location where the next hearing is going to take place. So that portion of it -- and again, I would say that that actually supports our position that we were correct in that. We are not saying that the DOE has made that concession, but I am saying that that is a reasonable inference based upon those facts. But the visual piece, which would really give meaning to this term "public" that's in --

THE COURT: No. If it meant visual, it would say visual. "Public" means accessible to the public, not contemporaneously, it means that they have an ability to see what has happened, either by reading a transcript, either by being present, or by reading about it in the press.

MR. ASHANTI: But your Honor used that term, and I believe that that is very apropos, "to see what has happened" later, after the fact. They wouldn't have that opportunity if --

THE COURT: But what I am trying to say is that I am no so sure that "open and public" means you have got to see it --

MR. ASHANTI: Okay. Understood, your Honor. But the

point being --

THE COURT: -- when every other means of knowing what happened is available to you.

MR. ASHANTI: In addition to the fact that there has been, you know, this pushback in terms of the A.G.'s office and the DOE is the fact that there is not even notice to the public. So we are stating that we have provisions that support the idea that when you have an open meeting that you have to actually give notice to the public. Otherwise, they won't know what's going on. And just —

THE COURT: Stop. Stop.

Let me hear from the city.

MR. THAYER: This argument about notice is completely out of left field. This isn't in any of the papers --

THE COURT: I know.

MR. THAYER: And it is black-letter law. It is in the law.

MR. COONEY: Respectfully, we have argued the same point five times. I mean, there is — I don't know how much more we can beat a dead horse here, respectfully. I don't see how they can convince anyone, as you said, any court, at this juncture that "open" means audiovisual capability. I don't see it. So —

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, your Honor -- I apologize.

I apologize.

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              MR. COONEY: I just --
              MR. ASHANTI: The -- what the AG's office has stated
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     is correct. It is something that is -- and I believe the city
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     might have touched on it, as well. It is stated in plain view,
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     in terms of the law, that New York State Public Officers Law,
     Article 7, Section 103 and Section 104, support the idea of a
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     public notice. Because without that --
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              THE COURT: What do you mean support the idea? Do
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     they decree it? Do they demand it? Is it stated clearly that
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     it has to be?
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              MR. ASHANTI: Public --
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              MR. COONEY: Your Honor --
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              MR. ASHANTI: Public --
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              MR. COONEY: Your Honor, I would object.
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              MR. ASHANTI: -- define --
              MR. COONEY: These are all --
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              THE COURT: Just a second. I already told you that
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     only --
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              MR. COONEY: Sorry, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: -- one person at a time can talk.
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              All right. Give him a chance.
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              MR. ASHANTI: Certainly.
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              MR. COONEY: This is really prejudicial to both the
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     city and the state.
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              THE COURT: Getting new arguments for the first time
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before me? 1 2 MR. COONEY: Yes. 3 THE COURT: I understand. 4 MR. COONEY: We could doing this all day literally. 5 THE COURT: I know, but we are not going to do it all 6 day. We are not going to do it all day. 7 MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, this is not something that the law is not a surprise -- it should not be a surprise to 8 anyone, right --9 MR. COONEY: Well, we are --10 MR. ASHANTI: -- so the idea of a -- what "public" 11 12 means, that implied in having something open to the public 13 means you have to give notice to the public? 14 THE COURT: No, it doesn't. There are specific things that say you have to give notice. 15 16 MR. ASHANTI: And we are citing one here, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: As far as I know, there are no New York or Second Circuit cases that recognize the right to audiovisual 18 capability in an IDEA hearing, and I am not going to start it. 19 20 MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, respectfully we respect that 21 position, your Honor, but we would just like to understand 22 that -- your Honor's statement about this case is correct in

that it is a position of first impression only because -- not

because the plaintiffs don't have the right to what's being

sought here, only because the plaintiffs are one of the few

that have ever even sought to enforce this right. So this is a right that just is sitting on the books that is collecting dust that --

THE COURT: But you are reading into what is sitting on the books certain things that are not stated on the books.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  ASHANTI: We believe that it is a reasonable interpretation of the use --

THE COURT: Reasonable interpretation --

MR. ASHANTI: Of "public" for the public who is not present at the time to be able to see what's going on at a later -- through a video recording, your Honor. In today's day and age, especially, seeing something does not -- is certainly -- is more than just reading about it your Honor.

THE COURT: I know, but that's what I am saying. It is degrees, by degrees. It is not to say that by reading about it is not sufficient for a open hearing.

MR. ASHANTI: We are just saying that today, in 2018, that the baseline in 1940 is different than it is in 2018.

THE COURT: Well, you know something? This is part of the problem. In terms of process, federal courts don't have cameras. So what you want me to do is say while I can't have a camera, I can order you to have a camera?

MR. ASHANTI: Only because a general litigant in this courtroom, your Honor, you know, a slip and fall with diversity action, or any kind of federal case that gets adjudicated here

would not -- they don't have a right to that. They don't have -- there is no provision, federal statute that they could point to to say, well, your Honor, respectfully, we are asserting our rights under this federal statute that says your Honor should grant access to the audiovisual media for the proceedings in this courtroom. Here it is different. It is distinguishable.

THE COURT: Let me -- show me the section or the statute or the regulation that says that you have to grant audiovisual.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: No, no.

MR. ASHANTI: -- it is 34 CFR 300.512(c). It does not specifically state that, your Honor, but what we are stating is it is a reasonable interpretation of the use of the term "public" in 2018, on November 1, 2018, that the public should have visual access to the proceedings, that that is a reasonable interpretation of that, your Honor.

THE COURT: It is a novel interpretation based on what's happened in precedent and through the years, and I'm not saying that it's unreasonable, I'm not saying that it is inappropriate, but I am saying that it is so out there in terms of how these proceedings have been going, that I cannot say that you are going to have a reasonable chance of succeeding on the merits.

There is no record before me. I keep saying this.

There is no record before me of what the ruling has been by the IHO. There is no record of what has happened with that ruling that has gone to the SRO, and the SRO has not written an opinion about that. What I am saying to you is that it is premature for you to come in here and talk about speculative damage because people couldn't see it.

MR. ASHANTI: Well, the damage would be to the plaintiff, not to the public, your Honor. Because it is the plaintiffs' rights that we are seeking to vindicate here.

And there are really two tracks. I understand your Honor's point that this has not gone through — the impartial hearing is not concluded, the SRO has not reviewed it, but that track is the normal adjudication track. This track, it's not — we don't have the ability to go to an SRO for emergent relief, and that's why we have exhausted —

THE COURT: But what I am trying to say to you is, you have no basis for emergent relief because there is nothing before me factually that is going to determine or give me a basis for making a ruling. This is all what may happen, what might happen. And I also do not see any argument supporting that the public has a visual right to access. The public has a right to access and it will have access either by attending, either by reading the transcript, either by reading the press coverage. I am not going to say that constitutionally you have

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a right to have audiovisual. 1 2 MR. ASHANTI: Right, your Honor. We are not asserting 3 the Constitution here. It is strictly statutory. But may the plaintiff be heard, your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: No. He is represented by you? 6 MR. ASHANTI: He is. He is also counsel, your Honor. 7 He is also an attorney. MR. COONEY: I would object to that, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: No, he is not. He is not going to talk 10 today. 11 MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor. Okay. We understood. 12 Just to be clear, we are not seeking to vindicate any 13 rights under the Constitution. We are just saying that this 14 federally guaranteed statutory right that due process demands 15 that because it is the plaintiff who is asserting it that the default position should be an open forum in the manner that --16 17 THE COURT: That he specifically and individually describes it so that --18 19 MR. ASHANTI: To the --20 THE COURT: -- so that when the next person comes, 21 that's going to control what happens? So he --22 MR. ASHANTI: To the extent -- sorry, I apologize. 23 THE COURT: You are asking for something that is too 24 speculative, too broad. Based on what is before me now, what

has happened, is just beginning, there have been no formal

rulings, no final rulings, there is no basis for me to say I am sure that you are going to be successful on the merits of getting audiovisual coverage in addition to what is available: the transcript, the press coverage, and members of the public being able to attend in what is now an even bigger space.

MR. ASHANTI: Your Honor, I would just say that the rulings that IHO Lloyd made clear, they are not going to change. So to the extent there is any issue regarding the finality of the rulings as it affects this case and the rights of this plaintiff, that has been determined, your Honor.

And again, your Honor, you know, I understand your Honor's point about the record, but we have the record, your Honor. We have the transcript.

THE COURT: You have a part of, a beginning of a record. You have a transcript where he said one thing that you do not like. And what I am saying is that for me to say that is a sufficient basis for me to rule in your favor would open up the gates for any time at any point in any proceeding when somebody doesn't like it to go running into court, and that is not how it is supposed to be.

I am supposed to have a record from which I can make a ruling. I have no record here. And the one thing that he said, which he could change, it is not written in stone, it is not a final ruling per se, is not a basis for me to say, yes, you have to have audiovisual.

So I do not think that there is irreparable harm. I do not think that there is a chance of success on the merits. I think that once there is a record, once we see what actually happens, and you can bring that to the SRO and the SRO makes a ruling, which may go in your favor, then there is a record for a federal court to get involved. We do not micromanage these things. If there was no public access at all, I think that I could see your point. But what I am saying is that there is public access. You just don't like it.

MR. ASHANTI: Just very briefly, your Honor, to your Honor's point of moving forward with other plaintiffs then being able to assert what Mr. Donohue is asserting here, the answer --

THE COURT: No, it's not just what he is asserting.

I'm saying that once they say "an open hearing" and "to me individually personally an open hearing is," that's the problem.

MR. ASHANTI: I think the bounds that your Honor is really pointing out is an important issue, but the bounds, I think, is what is reasonable. So if someone were to say something crazy or off the wall, then I would expect your Honor or another judge to say no, to bat them down on that.

But here, with the definition of "public" meaning, in terms of our interpretation -- and I believe it is a reasonable interpretation --

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THE COURT: I don't believe it is a reasonable interpretation, and I am ruling that way. MR. ASHANTI: Yes, your Honor. Understood. THE COURT: So that I am denying the preliminary injunction, which is the only issue that was before me. So that at this point I have made my ruling. This record is the basis for my ruling. It is not to say at some later point, when there is more that has happened, you might have a basis for coming in and saying this was wrong or that was wrong. But I'm not going to tell the IHO or the SRO what they should do. They are the ones who do what they are supposed to do; and then, when it is finished and you don't like it or the city doesn't like it, that's when I step in. So at this point, I am denying the request for a preliminary injunction.

You can take this. I am ordering this on a daily If you wish to appeal it, you have a right to appeal it. But that is my ruling.

MR. ASHANTI: Thank you, your Honor. Understood.

THE COURT: This matter is adjourned.

MR. COONEY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. THAYER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Please see the court reporter.

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